

THE YEAR OF CHANGE

REENGINEERING

THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT

Building a police organization that can dramatically reduce crime, disorder and fear.

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TAKING HOLD

A progress report on the crime control strategies of the NYPD.

MEETING THE TRAINING CHALLENGE

The importance of training.

N.Y.P.D.

THE YEAR OF CHANGE

Building a police organization that can dramatically reduce crime, disorder and fear.

Many New Yorkers have some inkling that there are changes afoot in the NYPD, but few people outside police circles grasp just how sweeping these changes are. When he came to office in 1994, Mayor Giuliani made law enforcement and policing a cornerstone of his administration. In effect, the Mayor changed the definition of success for the police department and set us a much higher standard of achievement. Instead of being satisfied with the incremental declines in crime we had achieved in the previous three years, we set the mission of dramatically reducing crime, disorder, and fear throughout the city.

We made substantial progress towards the Mayor's goal in 1994. Felony crime fell by 12 percent, the largest drop in more than 20 years. There were steep declines in homicides, shootings, and robberies — crimes that are the key indicators of the level of violence in our city. Homicides fell by more than 18 percent, the sharpest decline in the murder rate in the city's history. Three hundred and sixty fewer people have been killed this year than last and nearly 900 fewer people have been shot. As our strategies took hold in the latter part the year, we cut homicides by 32 percent in September, 46 percent in October, by 28 percent in November, and by a preliminary 34 percent in December.

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These results reflect our initial changes in the NYPD's strategy and organization, a refocusing of the department on its core mission of fighting crime, disorder, and fear. If we want to make the trend last, however, we are convinced that we have to do more. That's why we spent a lot of time and effort in 1994 working on a project we call "Reengineering the NYPD." We borrowed the term from the corporate world, where thorough reorganizations and restructurings have become commonplace in the lean 1990s. We decided that the NYPD needed the same kind of comprehensive approach that has done so much for companies like GE and Johnson & Johnson.

Under reengineering, we've taken an in-depth look at our operations from top to

bottom. Twelve reengineering teams included police officers and department civilians of every rank, as well as talented outsiders from the business world and academia. They opened every can of worms and looked under every rock. The bad news is that there is a lot in the NYPD that needs fixing. But there also is very good news. If we can fix what's broken and get the department performing up to its potential, then our ability to reduce crime, disorder, and fear will be just about unlimited.

This report includes the following subsections: "Taking Hold," an update on the the NYPD's crime control strategies and their impact in 1994; "Renengineering the New York City Police Department," an account of the steps we're taking to to build a police organization that is capable of dramatically reducing crime, disorder, and fear; and "Meeting the Training Challenge," a review of the training and communications initiatives that will help achieve a lasting impact on the culture of the NYPD in the 1990s. The year 1994 was a year of change. We're planning to make 1995, which happens to be the 150th anniversary of the NYPD, its best year ever.



N.Y.P.D.

Taking Hold

A Progress Report on the Crime Control Strategies of the NYPD

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Since January 1994, the NYPD has been engaged in an all-out effort to refocus the department's resources on its core mission of fighting crime, disorder, and fear. We have adopted five crime control strategies dealing with guns, youth violence, drugs, domestic violence, and public disorder. Each strategy includes a comprehensive analysis of how the department has been employing its police resources and each provides a blueprint for how these resources can be better marshaled to have a real and lasting impact.

The strategies had a significant impact in 1994, with felony crime falling 12 percent, the steepest drop in more than 20 years. Homicides were down more than 18 percent, the largest drop in New York City history. Shootings and robberies, key indicators of the level of violence in our city, were each down by more than 15 percent. It was the first year ever that the NYPD recorded double-digit drops in both homicides and robberies.

For the NYPD, the crime control strategies are not merely an assemblage of new tactics. They are a new way of doing business. The strategies are breaking down the barriers that have separated the Patrol Bureau, the Detective Bureau, and the Organized Crime Control Bureau. They are energizing our precinct commands by giving them new responsibilities and a bigger piece of the crime fighting action. The strategies are guiding and prioritizing our investigative work so that we are not merely closing individual cases but also achieving a cumulative impact on crime problems like guns, drugs, and youth violence. They are focusing police resources on problems we have long neglected, like domestic violence and public disorder. Best of all, the strategies are working. The sense that we can make a difference, that we can win, is spreading in the department and in the city.

NYPD Strategy No. 1

Getting Guns of the Streets of New York City

The NYPD gun strategy uses felony arrests and even summonses to open a window on gun trafficking in the city.

With as many as two million illegal guns in circulation in New York City, there were 1,500 gun deaths in 1993, 20 times the number in 1960. There were also 5,000 people wounded in shootings. Ninety percent of the guns seized in New York were originally purchased in other states, creating a major challenge for a local law enforcement agency.

The NYPD gun strategy uses felony arrests and even summonses to open a window on gun trafficking in the city. We are pursuing every perpetrator and accomplice in gun crimes and we are interrogating them all about how the gun was purchased so we can pursue the gun traffickers as well. We are also developing cases by asking people brought to the precinct house for minor offenses if they know where guns can be purchased. Because guns and drugs are parallel problems, we have replaced specialized drug units with Strategic Narcotics and Gun teams who go after both. We are working with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms to better monitor federally licensed gun dealers in New York and to combat interstate gun trafficking.

Measured by the damage guns do, the gun strategy has been very effective in 1994. There were 360 fewer people killed and nearly 900 fewer people wounded than in 1993. The homicide results for the last four months of 1994 showed a strong downward trend as the gun strategy took hold, with murders down 32 percent in September, 46 percent in October, 28 percent in November, and a preliminary 34 percent in December. There have been some interesting success stories. A drinking summons led to a person wanted on a warrant who led us to a gun dealer. A car thief we apprehended turned in a fence who turned in a father-and-son gun-dealing team. We have helped federal authorities make arrests as far away as Texas and Colorado to break operations that were mailing guns to New York City. In all, we've identified and arrested more than 200 gun dealers and confiscated their weapons caches.

N.Y.P.D.

NYPD Strategy No. 2

Curbing Youth Violence in the Schools and on the Streets

***The NYPD
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Although New York City's juvenile population declined by 25 percent between 1972 and 1990, youth murder arrests were up four times in same period, youth assault arrests were up three times, and youth robbery arrests more than doubled. Schools themselves have become a locus of crime, with reports of armed students commonplace. Fifteen percent of students, or 150,000 kids were absent from school and running the streets each day in 1993, as likely to be victims as perpetrators.

The NYPD youth violence strategy concentrates police resources on the exploding problem of youth crime. We have increased the number of youth officers in the precinct commands, giving us much more follow-up ability in individual cases and better program oversight. We're preparing school security plans for every school or school cluster — the most thorough look ever taken at policing and protecting school children in New York City. The security plans usually include safe corridor posts that protect kids on their way to and from school. The department is assembling a computerized juvenile crime data base to provide better and more retrievable information about youth cases and repeat offenders. Truancy squads, active throughout the city, have returned 18,000 truants to the school system so far this school year.

Our school safety programs are helping us control youth-on-youth crimes of opportunity, causing a significant reduction in the amount of crime committed by the school-age children and as well as in the number of school-age victims. A safe corridor program around two high schools in Staten Island, for instance, has cut youth-on-youth robberies from 12 in first six weeks of school last year to two this year. The increased focus on youth crime has also prompted some excellent preemptive police work. Alerted by an informant, anti-crime officers in a precinct in Queens broke up a major gang fight last summer, arresting 23 members of various gangs, confiscating two firearms at the scene, and developing information that led to the recovery of two illegally possessed shotguns.

NYPD Strategy No. 3

Driving Drug Dealers Out of New York City

NYPD drug strategy enforces a zero tolerance for drug dealing, bringing uniformed officers back into the war against drugs.

Drugs and especially crack are a major contributor to New York City crime. In 1993, 78 percent of all arrestees at Manhattan Central Booking tested positive for drugs, and 66 percent tested positive for cocaine. Twenty-five percent of all homicides in the city are directly related to drugs. At the close of 1993, there were more than 12,000 drug dealing locations, including 7,000 on the streets.

NYPD drug strategy enforces a zero tolerance for drug dealing, bringing uniformed officers back into the war against drugs. We are using special units to drive open air drug activity off the streets and close down indoor drug locations. Officers from the precincts then hold the retaken areas. We're targeting mid-level dealers much more aggressively and going after their guns, cash, drugs, and cars, as well as the locations they work out of. Narcotics arrests are up 27 percent. We confiscated 15,810 pounds of cocaine in 1994, compared with 7,215 pounds in 1993. We are currently planning an even more intensive assault on drugs in 1995.

We've watched the strategy take hold in a drug-blighted precinct in Brooklyn. Plainclothes officers from Strategic Narcotics and Gun teams flooded the precinct from January to June, making extensive drug arrests and 179 gun collars. Now, without special resources, the precinct personnel are maintaining the gains. Shootings are down, robberies are down, and arrests continue up, despite the decrease in complaints. The precinct is now taking the next step, having been authorized to investigate and enhance drug collars that would have been referred to special investigative units in the past. In just the first three weeks, the precinct has executed four search warrants, netting substantial amounts of drugs and guns, including two submachine guns, an assault rifle, a sawed-off shotgun, and a number of semiautomatic pistols.

NYPD Strategy No. 4

Breaking the Cycle of Domestic Violence

The NYPD domestic violence strategy is creating an early warning system on domestic violence and providing the resources to intervene when the warning sounds.

Domestic violence is the great hidden crime problem in New York City. It is estimated to cause 30 percent of the cases in emergency wards. Women are six times more likely to be killed in their homes than on the street. Children who grow up as victims and witnesses of domestic violence are far more likely to become both domestic abusers and street criminals.

The NYPD domestic violence strategy is creating an early warning system on domestic violence and providing the resources to intervene when the warning sounds. We have assigned a domestic violence officer and a domestic violence investigator in all NYPD precincts. Using a new Domestic Violence Incident Report, filed every time police respond to a domestic incident, the domestic violence officers can track the history of a family, identify chronic abuse patterns, and intervene proactively. If a criminal investigation is necessary, the domestic violence investigator is there to coordinate it. Citywide, we are generating about 3,000 domestic incident reports a week.

The role of domestic violence officer is attracting some of our most idealistic young cops, people who will use all their skills and imagination to reach and help women and children in danger. One domestic violence officer managed to place a woman in a shelter for battered women in Canada to get her out of the reach of an abusive partner. Another domestic violence officer, assigned to a precinct in the Bronx, has made numerous arrests under the program. His reputation for responsiveness and sensitivity prompted community groups to refer two rape victims to him, victims who might not have approached the police at all. Both rapists were arrested.

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NYPD Strategy No. 5

Reclaiming the Public Spaces of New York City

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A strategy to deal with street disorder is, in many ways, the linchpin of the other strategies because it affects people's perception and fear of crime. Controlling disorder can also change the behavior of criminals who are less likely to commit crimes in a well-policed, orderly environment. For more than 20 years, the NYPD gave a low priority to such offenses as boom-box radios, street prostitution, underage drinking, squeegee pests, and drag racing. Any combination of these activities can blight a neighborhood. Our failure to deal with disorder is one reason why New York, which is 22nd among large cities in reported crime, is probably number one in the perception and fear of crime.

The NYPD strategy for reclaiming public spaces includes more than a dozen specific tactics for countering disorder in all its forms. Many tactics involve the confiscation, closing, or temporary seizure of property whether a vehicle, a drug paraphernalia shop, or house of prostitution. Our Operation Losing Proposition confiscates the cars of people who patronize street prostitutes. Operation Sound Trap uses sound meters to trap boom-box cars and loud motorcycles and take the vehicles off the street. We're using nuisance abatement and other civil laws to close down properties where criminal activities take place. Through steady police presence and arrests when necessary, we've all but eliminated the squeegee pests who beg by cleaning windshields.

Police presence and police pressure can win through against disorder. In a precinct in eastern Brooklyn, a drag racing problem of 15 years duration was eradicated by police and Department of Transportation officials who worked successive Sunday afternoons last spring to tow unlicensed, uninsured, and uninspected vehicles. A drag racing area that had attracted hundreds cars and thousands of bettors was shut down. Neighborhood residents report the quietest summer in memory.

N.Y.P.D.*1994 NYC Felony Crime Statistics (with comparisons to 1993)****COMPLAINTS**

	1993	1994	%Change
Murder	1946	1586	-18.34%
Rape	3226	3200	-0.81%
Robbery	85883	72559	-15.51%
Felony Assault	41116	39770	-3.27%
Burglary	100933	90378	-10.46%
Grand Larceny	85531	75314	-11.95%
Grand Larceny Auto	111611	94525	-15.31%
Total	430252	377327	-12.30%
Shooting Victims	5861	4967	-15.25%
Shooting Incidents	5268	4405	-16.38%

ARRESTS

	1993	1994	%Change
Murder	1243	1266	1.85%
Rape	1326	1494	12.67%
Robbery	25106	25628	2.08%
Felony Assault	18964	21624	14.03%
Burglary	9291	10415	12.10%
Grand Larceny	11850	11844	-0.05%
Grand Larceny Auto	6256	5512	-11.89%
Total	74036	77783	5.06%
Narcotics Arrests	65452	83451	27.50%
All NYPD Arrests (including misdemeanors)	203351	247081	21.50%

**Figures are preliminary and subject to further analysis and revision.*

Reengineering The New York City Police Department

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Why Reengineering?

Like many private corporations that have chosen to reengineer, the NYPD was an organization that wasn't living up to its potential. The department evaluated itself by incremental changes in crime statistics and by various internal measures that didn't reflect our true performance or our impact on the public. Although serious crime declined by small percentage amounts in 1991, 1992, and 1993, the department was capable of a far higher performance. The organization wasn't being sufficiently challenged.

The NYPD was like a company whose day-to-day operations seem to be running smoothly until closer examination reveals that it isn't really preparing for the challenges of the future. The department was losing its sense of mission, its sense that it could win, and its sense of connection with the public. To some degree, the public sensed these problems before we did. New Yorkers were frightened of crime, and no amount of fanfare about a small drop in felonies would change their view. With our community policing efforts still in the beginning stages, many people, and especially minorities, continued to view us as a remote organization whose agenda had little to do with protecting them or easing their fears.

Mayor Rudolph Giuliani came to office in 1994 determined to make major improvements in the economy, education, and law enforcement. In effect, the Mayor changed the definition of success for the police department. Instead of being satisfied with incremental declines in crime, we set the mission of dramatically reducing crime, disorder, and fear. Reengineering became the means to support that mission, the way we would build an organization capable of achieving our ambitious goal.

N.Y.P.D.

We are putting the function of fighting crime and disorder front and center again. We have established strategies for using the full resources of department to more effectively combat guns, drugs, youth violence, domestic violence, and public disorder.

Strategic Reengineering

Like a corporation that had drifted too far from its core business, the NYPD had spent very little time thinking strategically about crime and disorder. Special units worked on pieces of the crime problem, but no one was seeing it whole. As result, the related problems of guns, drugs, and youth violence were reaching epidemic proportions in some neighborhoods. In addition, the department had withdrawn, over a 20 year period, from enforcing public order. It had allowed disorder conditions to develop in many neighborhoods that emboldened criminals and fed the public's fear.

We are putting the function of fighting crime and disorder front and center again. We have established strategies for using the full resources of the department to more effectively combat guns, drugs, youth violence, domestic violence, and public disorder. These strategies cut across department disciplines and fiefdoms and involve the precinct commands, which had been kept out of a lot of crime fighting in the past. We are following through on every gun, drug, and youth gang arrest, interrogating gun criminals, for instance, about where they got their guns and going after the illegal gun dealers. We are using crime statistics not just as way of keeping score at the end of the year but as a way of making day-to-day adjustments in our tactics. We hold tough, probing, weekly meetings with borough and precinct commanders and detective squad leaders to energize the command staff and keep the focus sharp.

We are placing a strong emphasis on public order because an atmosphere where small crimes go unpunished is atmosphere where fear and serious crime will thrive. If community policing is to mean anything it must mean that the police respond to the common complaints from communities about prostitution, boom-box cars, squeegee pests, drag racing, underage drinking, and a host of other low level offenses. In one of our most successful cross-disciplinary efforts, lawyers from the department's legal bureau are working in the field with precinct commanders. They are using forfeiture and nuisance abatement laws to close down houses of prostitution, drug locations, chop shops, and other properties that are a locus for crime and fear in our neighborhoods.

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Structural and Technological Reengineering

To support our strategies we have to make basic changes in the way we organize our work. The NYPD is an overspecialized and top heavy organization that has often failed to perform at the precinct level where we can do the most to prevent crime. We are also one of the most technologically bereft organizations of our size and scope anywhere in the United States.

We are reorganizing and restructuring the NYPD with the primary goal of increasing the authority, resources, and responsibility of the commanders in the department's 76 precincts. We're going to cut staff at headquarters and the special units to strengthen the precincts. We're institutionalizing a precinct-based system of rewards that encourages high performance and establishes a meaningful career path for patrol officers. We've flattened the NYPD organizational layer cake by eliminating one whole level of executive supervision. Like a decentralized corporation that allows wide latitude to the CEOs of its subsidiaries, we are creating 76 miniature police departments within the NYPD. The chain of command has been shortened and strengthened for the purposes of keeping the department on track strategically, but most day-to-day operations will be managed at the precinct level. The community policing focal point in the reengineered NYPD will be the seasoned precinct commander not the 25-year-old beat officer.

The NYPD is so backward technologically that we can achieve major savings and efficiencies if we can just find the capital to make the initial investment in technology and the expertise to ensure technology that meets both our current and future needs. Fortunately, in a time of strained municipal budgets, the newly passed federal crime bill offers significant assistance. It will help fund arrest processing technologies that will shave some 12 hours off the 14 hours NYPD cops spend on the arrest-to-arraignment process for each arrest. Mobile data terminals in patrol cars and an enhanced 911 emergency response system will also add greatly to the efficiency and safety of our operations.

With training sessions, videos, newsletters, and active, walk-around management, we're building a culture of respect in the NYPD — respect for each other, respect for the people we serve, and respect for the great tradition of our department.

Cultural Reengineering

Imagine a business that delivers a service as complex as policing — requiring a detailed knowledge of the law, coolness in a crises, physical courage, and the ability to work with all kinds of people. Now recognize that, for most of the day, there is no practical way to directly supervise the workforce, who are on solo or dual patrol. Add the fact that a third of the workforce is under 25 and that most have no military experience or family police tradition. Now add the unfortunate reality that a small portion of the workforce is corrupt and may be drawing impressionable young cops into their web. That's the training challenge — the cultural reengineering challenge — in the NYPD.

Cultural reengineering starts at the top with tone set by the command staff. We want active cops but humane cops, cops who take command without being abusive, cops who confront problems without unnecessarily confronting people. These issues all revolve around the idea of respect. It's the key cultural concept in policing, and, in some of the tougher neighborhoods, it's the key to survival. With training sessions, videos, newsletters, and active, walk-around management, we're building a culture of respect in the NYPD — respect for each other, respect for the people we serve, and respect for the great tradition of our department.

We are also building a culture of activity. We are unleashing the creativity and energy of precinct police officers from the dead hand of bureaucratic procedure which often kept them out of the crime-fighting front lines. By letting cops be cops, we get tougher, more responsive local policing and the added benefit that active, effective police officers are less vulnerable to corruption and police brutality. The precinct house that is the center of an effective program to combat crime and disorder is not going to be the precinct where corruption takes hold. We're building a stronger precinct organization, with a highly focused commander and well-trained and authoritative front-line supervisors. It's the best way to keep cops active in the fight against crime and disorder — and the best way to keep them from committing crimes themselves.

We don't have reengineering budgets or the ability to put people on these projects full time, yet we have established a quality process that is producing a quality result.

The Reengineering Process

While we have adopted the corporate model of reengineering, we don't have corporate resources. We are constrained not only by a shortage of municipal funds and the need to cut costs for this year's budget, but also by civil service law, arcane government procurement practices, and intense press scrutiny. Nevertheless, we have been able to push forward a very productive reengineering process. We don't have reengineering budgets or the ability to put people on these projects full time, yet we have established a quality process that is producing a quality result.

After two months of intensive work, 12 reengineering teams reported in the Summer of 1994. The teams included top managers, field commanders, supervisory officers, police officers, department civilians, and a number of outside volunteers who are knowledgeable about police work and managing large organizations. They studied department procedures, practices, and policies more thoroughly than at any time in our history. We had teams on Building Community Partnerships, Geographical vs. Functional Organizational Structure, Precinct Organization, Supervisory Training, In-Service Training, Productivity, Paperwork, Integrity, Rewards and Career Paths, Discipline, Equipment and Uniforms, and Technology. The reengineering process yielded more than 600 recommendations that are currently being shaped into a *Plan of Action*. To guard against it being a top-down document that doesn't reflect the rank and file, the Plan of Action will also draw upon focus groups conducted with police officers and an opinion survey completed by nearly 8,000 NYPD cops.

Our lack of fiscal resources is offset by an extraordinarily talented and dedicated workforce. We have many high-performing individuals in the NYPD who deserve to working in a high-performing organization. A primary goal of reengineering is to break down the barriers that block their creativity and energy and to get them in the game. If we can get 31,000 motivated, active cops in the game, then our goal of dramatically reducing crime, disorder, and fear is as good as accomplished.

N.Y.P.D.

Meeting the Training Challenge

The importance of the training agenda to our overall success cannot be overstated. Organizational and structural changes in police departments tend to be ineffective in the absence of underlying cultural change.

The NYPD has what can only be described as a huge training agenda for the coming years. Our strategies are asking a lot of precinct commanders, front-line supervisors, and the cops in the field, and we need to train them better for the task. We are creating training programs that increase police effectiveness, enhance police and public safety, and improve police attitudes toward the people and the communities they serve.

Respect

Perhaps the single most important training programs in 1995 will be major in-house initiative on the issue of respect. We will working to increase understanding and to bridge the "them vs. us" gap that unfortunately divides so many communities from their police departments. We also be conducting very practical training to increase the communications skills of police officers. The respect initiative will emphasize the psychological and verbal tactics to defuse and de-escalate conflicts and to exert authority without bullying. In all our training and communications we will be heightening police awareness that a respectful attitude toward the community and the good feeling it engenders ultimately protects cops by exposing them to fewer high-tension situations, including angry crowds and people resisting arrest.

Leadership Institute

The plan to enhance the NYPD Leadership Institute addresses one of the most important elements in any police department, the skills of the individuals who make up the chain of command. Police departments have always promoted from the ranks but they have rarely done enough to prepare promotees for the wider range of activities and the greatly increased responsibilities that go with each promotion. The enhanced NYPD Leadership Institute will be a vehicle for molding the supervisory skills of sergeants and lieutenants, the command skills of precinct commanders, and the higher management skills of the highest echelon of NYPD executives.

Combat Simulators

As we continue to police the drug and gun underworld more aggressively, our officers will need the sharpest possible combat skills to protect both themselves and the public. Computer-driven systems that simulate combat situations have been shown to be vastly superior to static range practice in teaching officers the judgmental skills they need in the field. These systems teach cops as much about withholding fire as about firing. The officers learn how to distinguish innocent people from criminals and how to keep control of developing combat situations.

Driving Simulators

Similar to combat simulators, driving simulators give officers the chance to make mistakes and learn from them without injuring themselves or others. The youthful officers on today's force share the belief of young people everywhere in their own immortality and invincibility behind the wheel. The simulators will show some of these "cowboys" that they are not as good as they think they are and help us teach them some well-advised caution. As part of a broader program of auto safety within the department, the simulators will help us reduce the vehicle accidents that injure more than 1,000 police officers each year.

Video Communications

Internal communications is an important part of changing the culture of any organization, and this is doubly so in police departments. We expect that video will be the centerpiece of our internal communications efforts over the next several years. Videos have proven a very effective way to reach cops with specific training messages as well as with more general messages that support morale and change attitudes. But we can't reach the television generation with static productions or traditional-style training videos. Young cops are too sophisticated about television for that. We will be

upgrading the equipment and capabilities of the department's video unit to produce sophisticated video programming that supports the department's strategic and training agendas.

150th Anniversary

We plan to use the 150th Anniversary of the NYPD in 1995 as a way of building pride in the department and of focusing today's cops not only on the history behind them but also on the mission in front of them. The 150th Anniversary will be a continuing theme throughout the year, highlighted by a police parade and other events and ceremonies. We'll also be using such devices as exhibits, calendars, videos, brochures, pins, breast bars, and other memorabilia to give the year a special sense of significance and purpose.

Advertising

We intend to use general media advertising as another way of reaching and communicating with police officers. General ad campaigns for police departments are as important for what they communicate to cops as they are for what they communicate to the public. Police officers, who generally feel underappreciated, like to know that their story is being told. One of the most effective morale boosters at the Transit Police in 1990 and 1991 was a series of high-profile radio ads funded by the MTA. Advertising will help create a real working partnership between the police and public in driving down crime, disorder, and fear.

The importance of the training agenda to our overall success cannot be overstated. Organizational and structural changes in police departments tend to be ineffective in the absence of underlying cultural change. In 1995 and beyond, the NYPD will be aiming for genuine cultural change. With carefully designed and targeted training and communications efforts, we believe that we can achieve a major improvement not only in the quality of police service but in the quality of life in New York City.